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Preface 
The research project on Systems Analysis of Technological and Economic Dynamics a t  IIASA is 
concerned with modeling technological and organisational change; the broader economic devel- 
opments that  are associated with technological change, both as cause and effect; the processes 
by which economic agents - first of all, business firms - acquire and develop the capabilities 
to  generate, imitate and adopt technological and organisational innovations; and the aggregate 
dynamics - a t  the levels of single industries and whole economies - engendered by the interac- 
tions among agents which are heterogeneous in their innovative abilities, behavioural rules and 
expectations. The central purpose is to  develop stronger theory and better modeling techniques. 
However, the basic philosophy is that  such theoretical and modeling work is most fruitful when 
attention is paid to  the known empirical details of the phenomena the work aims to  address: 
therefore, a considerable effort is put into a better understanding of the 'stylized facts' concern- 
ing corporate organisation routines and strategy; industrial evolution and the 'demography' of 
firms; patterns of macroeconomic growth and trade. 
From a modeling perspective, over the last decade considerable progress has been made on 
various techniques of dynamic modeling. Some of this work has employed ordinary differential 
and difference equations, and some of it stochastic equations. A number of efforts have taken 
advantage of the growing power of simulation techniques. Others have employed more traditional 
mathematics. As a result of this theoretical work, the toolkit for modeling technological and 
economic dynamics is significantly richer than it was a decade ago. 
During the same period, there have been major advances in the empirical understanding. 
There are now many more detailed technological histories available. Much more is known about 
the similarities and differences of technical advance in different fields and industries and there is 
some understanding of the key variables that  lie behind those differences. A number of studies 
have provided rich information about how industry structure co-evolves with technology. In 
addition to  empirical work a t  the technology or sector level, the last decade has also seen a 
great deal of empirical research on productivity growth and measured technical advance a t  the 
level of whole economies. A considerable body of empirical research now exists on the facts that  
seem associated with different rates of productivity growth across the range of nations, with the 
dynamics of convergence and divergence in the levels and rates of growth of income, with the 
diverse national institutional arrangements in which technological change is embedded. 
As a result of this recent empirical work, the questions that  successful theory and useful 
modeling techniques ought to  address now are much more clearly defined. The theoretical work 
has often been undertaken in appreciation of certain stylized facts that  needed t o  be explained. 
The list of these 'facts' is indeed very long, ranging from the microeconomic evidence concerning 
for example dynamic increasing returns in learning activities or the persistence of particular sets 
of problem-solving routines within business firms; the industry-level evidence on entry, exit and 
size-distributions - approximately log-normal - all the way to  the evidence regarding the time- 
series properties of major economic aggregates. However, the connection between the theoretical 
work and the empirical phenomena has so far not been very close. The philosophy of this project 
is that  the chances of developing powerful new theory and useful new analytical techniques can 
be greatly enhanced by performing the work in an environment where scholars who understand 
the empirical phenomena provide questions and challenges for the theorists and their work. 
In particular, the project is meant t o  pursue an 'evolutionary' interpretation of technological 
and economic dynamics modeling, first, the processes by which individual agents and organisa- 
tions learn, search, adapt; second, the economic analogues of 'natural selection' by which inter- 
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active environments - often markets - winnow out a population whose members have different 
attributes and behavioural traits; and, third, the collective emergence of statistical pat terns, 
regularities and higher-level structures as the aggregate outcomes of the two former processes. 
Together with a group of researchers located permanently a t  IIASA, the project coordinates 
multiple research efforts undertaken in several institutions around the world, organises workshops 
and provides a venue of scientific discussion among scholars working on evolutionary modeling, 
computer simulation and non-linear dynamical systems. 
The research focuses upon the following three major areas: 
1. Learning Processes and Organisational Competence. 
2. Technological and Industrial Dynamics 
3. Innovation, Competition and Macrodynamics 
FOUR Rs OF PROFITABILITY: 
RENTS, RESOURCES, ROUTINES AND REPLICATION 
Sidney G. Winter* 
The Wharton School 
This paper seeks to connect related strands of thought in 
evolutionary economics and the resource-based view of the firm. 
Although conceived primarily as an approach to the descriptive 
analysis of the firm and industry, evolutionary economics offers a 
distinctive view of the firm that is adaptable for the purposes of 
normative analysis (Winter, 1987). The resource-based view, as it 
has been developed in the strategy literature, seeks to derive 
normative guidance for business decision making from a deeper 
understanding of the sources of interfirm profitability differences 
(Wernerfelt, 1984; Rumelt 1984). It interprets these as reflections 
of differences in streams of rents and quasi-rents accruing to 
firms, which in turn are attributed to differences in the control 
and management of strategic resources. 
Both approaches place major emphasis on the heterogeneity of 
the population of business firms and on the sources of that 
heterogeneity in the idiosyncratic internal features of individual 
firms (Rumelt, 1984; Nelson, 1991). Although the focal issues 
differ somewhat, there are areas of substantial overlap. 
A prominent example of such overlap relates to the nature and 
sources of productive competence in the individual firm. In 
evolutionary economics, a business firm is first and foremost an 
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organization that knows how to do something. In the resource-based 
view of the firm, the scope of the term "resources" is certainly 
broad enough to include the knowledge underlying the firm's 
productive competence (Wernerfelt, 1984). 
The heart of the normative guidance offered by the resource- 
based view lies in the idea of leveraging the idiosyncratic profit 
opportunities latent in existing resource endowments. When the 
resources in question are productive routines, such exploitation 
often takes the form of replicating the firm's routines in the quest 
for greater profit through growth, a process that is a central 
feature of evolutionary economics. These relationships between the 
two approaches suggest an inviting target for further inquiry, and 
a llcompare and contrast" analysis of this area is the general 
purpose of this paper. 
Asenda. The strategy field has its " 5  forces11 analysis and its 
"7-S" framework; this paper has a " 4  Rs" theme: rents, resources, 
routines and replication. Routines are the building blocks of 
organizational capability. As such, routines clearly qualify as 
resources, given the expansive use of the term "resources" in the 
literature of the resource-based view. On the other hand, resources 
in a narrow sense (e.g., appropriately specialized labor and 
machinery) are requisites of the performance of most routines, and 
the knowledge underlying a routine is embodied or embedded to a 
large extent in its associated human, physical and organizational 
capital. The first objective here is to further explicate this 
routines/resources relationship. 
The next step is to fit the rents and replication pieces into 
the profitability picture. An emphasis on replication, and on the 
types of resources that can be exploited ' through replication, 
differentiates the evolutionary approach from the resource-based 
view. Replication of profitable routines is only one approach to 
leveraging the profit opportunities latent in an initial resource 
endowment. Compared, however to the broader idea of "leveraging," 
it is relatively specific in its content and implications. 
The 4 Rs discussion turns up two sets of issues that deserve 
closer analysis. Both have to do with appraising the results of the 
quest for profitability. The first set relates to the problem of 
conceptualizing and measuring profitability itself, and the second 
to the problem of appraising the social implications of profit- 
seeking behavior. Both sets include some difficult analytical and 
conceptual issues. An exploratory treatment of these matters 
occupies two sections of the paper. A brief concluding comment 
looks again at the wider horizons of the subject. 
Throughout, this paper builds on contributions in the prior 
literature of the resource-based view, going back to Penrose (1959) . 
As suggested above, the discussion here is narrower in focus than 
most of the resource-based literature, emphasizing resources and 
processes that are closely related to themes in evolutionary theory. 
The hoped-for benefits of this narrowed focus include a sharper view 
of certain issues, and the establishment of the clearest possible 
connections to the treatment of the corresponding issues in 
evolutionary economics. 
ROUTINES AND RESOURCES 
The definitions of key theoretical terms are often rather broad 
and hazy; ample room is left for pragmatic adjustment as new 
problems are addressed. This pattern is well illustrated by the 
cases llresourcestl and "routines." Wernerfelt (1984) explains that 
the term uresources" embraces " . . .  anything that could be termed a 
strength or weakness of a given firm . . . .  11 - -  " . . . (tangible or 
intangible) assets which are tied semi-permanently to the firm . . . . "  
Subsequent discussion in the literature has emphasized the resources 
that underlie competitive advantage ( "strengths" ) , and has sought to 
identify the characteristics such resources must have if success is 
to be sustained. The term "routine" has been used in evolutionary 
economics in a similarly expansive fashion. Nelson and Winter 
(1982) say that " . . .  most of what is resular and ~redictable about 
business behavior is plausibly subsumed under the heading "routine," 
especially if we understand that term to include the relatively 
constant dispositions and strategic heuristics that shape the 
approach of a firm to the non-routine problems it faces. " (p. 15) . 
Given the expansiveness of these definitions, the existence of 
a substantial overlap should come as no surprise. At a micro level, 
a routine in operation at a particular site can be conceived as a 
web of coordinating relationships connecting specific resources; 
without those resources it could not exist. Considered as an 
abstract activity pattern, however, "that same routine" may be in 
operation also at a different site, where a different but similar 
set of resources is coordinated by a very similar web of 
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relationships: the routine has been replicated. This suggests that 
the routine per se - -  the abstract activity pattern - -  is itself a 
resource. 
In the context of strategic decision making, the two terms have 
different connotations. wResources" suggests an inventory of items 
whose relationship to decision options requires definition through 
strategic analysis. By contrast, "routines" connotes a menu of 
previously learned patterns of action. Typically, some of these 
patterns have acquired the status of default options: they are 
carried out in the absence of an explicit decision to the contrary. 
Deliberate decision making (when it occurs) often takes the form of 
a choice from the prevailing menu of routines. It can, however, 
take less structured forms as well, such as the development of an 
intention to expand the menu in a particular direction. 
Diversity of resources and manasement challenses. The 
preceding paragraphs attempt to capture what can be said about the 
general conceptual relationships between uresources" and "routines." 
This paper, however, aims not at a comprehensive treatment of these 
relationships, but at a careful examination of some of the issues 
that are specific to the overlap between the two concepts. Some 
types of resources are more relevant than others in this connection, 
and a preliminary task is to pick out from the broad array of 
ilresources~ the types that are most closely linked to "routines.I1 
In the literature of the resource-based view, a broad range of 
resource types has been mentioned by way of illustration. There is 
a corresponding diversity in the managerial tasks required for the 
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effective development and exploitation of the different resources. 
Defending the intellectual property represented by a patent position 
is quite a different undertaking from defending the team-embodied 
skills of the professionals in the R&D lab, which is in turn quite 
different from defending the team-embodied skills and specialized 
assets of the assembly line. When reputation is at stake, it is not 
so much the legal context as pragmatic understanding of human nature 
and of the media environment that is the issue. Also, while a 
reputation for toughness may be generally valuable, it must be 
developed and exercised quite differently with respect to rivals, 
suppliers and workers. Different types of resources thus pose quite 
different managerial challenges, and may be strategic or "critical" 
to quite different degrees (Wernerfelt, 1989) 
Although the specific challenges differ widely across 
resources, they typically involve both a static aspect and a dynamic 
aspect. The static aspect consists of employing the resource to 
generate a flow of quasi-rents in the near term. In the explanation 
of interf irm prof itability differences at given point in time, it is 
this static aspect of differing resource endowments that dominates 
the picture. The most interesting strategic issues, however, 
involve the dynamic aspect - -  the challenge of leveraging the 
existing resource position into a more favorable future position 
(Diericks and Cool, 1989; Kogut and Zander, 1992). This challenge 
in turn has different components, among which the following three 
may be identified: (i) the speculative component, where superiority 
involves a better eye for resource value, (ii) the develo~mental 
component, where advantage inheres in a superior ability to amplify 
the contributions of present resources and expand existing lines of 
activity, and (iii) the creative component, which consists of the 
ability to combine resources in novel ways and establish new 
activities. It is in addressing the dynamics of resource 
exploitation that one finds the strongest complementarities between 
the resource-based view and evolutionary economics - -  and also 
between those two and the synthesis dubbed the "dynamic capabilities 
approach" by Teece, Pisano and Shuen (forthcoming) . 
Montgomery ( 1 9 9 2 )  provides a good illustration of the static- 
dynamic distinction in an exposition featuring the Disney cartoon 
characters as a key resource of Walt Disney Company; her example 
also serves well to illustrate the role of creativity. 
From the static viewpoint, the value of this type of resource 
is fundamentally a matter of intellectual property law. If there 
were no way to prevent rivals from doing a knock off copy of any 
Mouse-related product, then there might be esteem but there would be 
little prof it in the claim to offer the One and Only Original Mickey 
Mouse. In fact, however, the law does protect the profit potential 
of that claim and the corresponding claims with respect to other 
characters. Given the protection of that institutional frame, 
however, the Mouse and his friends cannot merely reproduce 
indefinitely in the form of any given product, but also mutate into 
entirely new forms.2 This possibility illustrates the dynamic 
aspect of the profit opportunity inherent in the Disney characters: 
how can human creativity be applied to exploit these profit 
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potentials in ways that are ever-new in detail, and responsive to 
ever-changing circumstances? 
Montgomeryf s example nicely illuminates the subtlety of this 
dynamic aspect. On the one hand, it is clear that the Disney 
characters are a very valuable resource indeed. On the other hand, 
just how valuable it is probably depends fundamentally on the 
effectiveness with which human creativity is mobilized to expand its 
applications. Because of the inherent uniqueness of creative 
achievement, the amount that analysis from the strategic management 
viewpoint can contribute much to such an undertaking is open to 
question. At the same time, the example also serves well to 
illustrate the point that the concerns of the resource-based view 
are broader than those addressed in this paper: here, more attention 
is given to the relatively prosaic developmental component of 
resource dynamics than to the creative component. 
Team-embodied skills as the focal example. The type of 
resource to which this discussion relates most directly is team- 
embodied skills, and the corresponding routines are the activities 
in which the team exercises those skills repetitively. Illustrative 
settings might include an assembly line, the back office operations 
of a financial institution, a fast food counter, a construction 
site, an airport gate, or a football field, to name but a few. 
There are several related propositions about these situations that 
derive from the basic understanding of skills and routines developed 
in evolutionary economics; all touch on the central point that 
routines and supporting skill packages are a key repository of 
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knowledge in the firm: the firm "knows how" to do something because 
it commands the appropriate routines. 
Organizational command of a routine is not reducible to the 
level of individual skills, because the context of each individual 
performance includes the performances of other members; learned 
patterns of interpersonal coordination are the basis of. team 
performance. 
By the same token, command of the routine does not reduce to 
the resource "team-embodied skills" because there is more to the 
context of individual performance than just the performances of 
other team members. Heading the list of these other contextual 
features are the equipment and facilities (appropriately arranged 
and installed) that establish the physical setting; next come the 
information flows from the environment that trigger particular 
performances. But the list of possible context dependencies 
continues more or less indefinitely. 
The fact that the appropriate details of individual performance 
are linked to highly specific contexts implies that the required 
constituent resources are not available as such in the marketplace. 
The requisite mutual consistency of individual contexts is the 
product of organizational learning and other processes that reshape 
the skills of individuals after they have joined the organization. 
"'Generic labor1 is rented in the market; firm-specific skills, 
knowledge and values are accumulated through on the job learning and 
training." (Dierickx and Cool, 1989, p. 1504). 
The knowledge and information-related aspects of inputs joined 
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in a productive routine represent territory that is largely 
unexplored by economic analysis. Following the classic exposition 
of information economics by Arrow (1962), most scholars have 
recognized that information is not an ordinary economic commodity 
subject to ratio-scale measurement, but something with an economic 
logic of its own. Central to this logic is the contrast between 
high costs of initial creation or acquisition and costs of 
reproduction that are so low as to be considered negligible. At the 
opposite conceptual pole from Arrow-type information are service 
flows of generic inputs, whose potential for contributing 
information to the production process is left implicit in their 
definition, description or index number. For these inputs, ratio- 
scale measurement is thought to be non-problematic. Team-embodied 
skills occupy an intermediate position between these poles. They do 
embody significant information and their initial creation involves 
corresponding up-front costs - -  characteristics of Arrow-type 
information. On the other hand, like ordinary inputs, they are 
required in production on a continuing basis in some ratio to the 
level of activity, and the costs of additional units do not become 
negligible after the first unit is acquired. As for ratio-scale 
measurement, it is certainly feasible to measure the service flows 
in terms of the time put in; economically significant ambiguity 
nevertheless arises because the definition, observation and 
measurement of the relevant skills are all problematic. This 
ambiguity may result in significant transactional hazards because of 
the buyer's inability to ascertain what he or she is buying. 
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Resources with these characteristics occupy a central position 
in evolutionary economics and the resource-based view of the firm; 
team-embodied skills provide the most straightforward illustration 
of the general analytical issues involved. One issue in particular 
is central to the discussion of replication that follows - -  the 
character of the process by which new members acquire their skills, 
or by which new similar teams are created. Frequently, this 
instruction process places demands on the time of individuals 
already possessing the skills, and thus involves a short term 
sacrifice in terms of the availability for current production of 
skills of the very type that the firm seeks to expand. More 
generally, the instruction process relies on some resources 
idiosyncratic to the firm, if not literally on the members of some 
"template team." 
REPLICATION AND RENTS - -  AND MONOPOLY RETURNS 
Because appropriately specializedinput resources cannot simply 
be purchased on markets, the firm's use of a profitable routine is 
limited in the "short run" by its available stocks of those 
resources, if by nothing else. The mix of activity may be subject 
to routine adjustment, but individual activities are always subject 
to upper bound constraints set by the availability of the input 
service flows containing coordinating information. 
Over time, however, the firm can typically augment its stocks 
of all of the requisite resources. It can acquire and install new 
units of specialized equipment, or produce these itself. Most 
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importantly, it can develop new supplies of the team-embodied skills 
capable of coordinating the routine. It can therefore replicate 
existing activity patterns on a larger scale. In the conceptually 
simplest case, this means starting up a new plant with capabilities 
that are intended to be substantially identical to those of the 
original, "template," plant. Such a replication effort involves 
not merely the establishment of the appropriate physical setting, 
but also the replication of a hierarchical structure of 
organizational routines. Of course, even if exact replication is 
aimed at, it will never be fully achieved in practice, and a number 
of variables will af fect its actual precision. In many actual cases 
the objective is not exact replication but partial replication, 
accompanied by adaptive or innovative change in some routines. 
The analysis of replication presents a number of interesting 
and challenging issues. In the strategic management literature, 
most of the illumination of the subject has been indirect, reflected 
from inquiries into the problems facing a rival who aspires to 
imitate a profitable performance where productive knowledge is not 
codified (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982; Barney, 1986, 1991; Reed and 
DeFillippi, 1990) . Less severe versions of the same problems 
confront the effort to replicate a productive performance within the 
boundaries of the same firm, but these have received less attention. 
It has been noted, however. that there are subtle and important 
considerations linking imitation, replication and the problem of 
sustainable advantage (Winter, 1987; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Zander 
and Kogut, forthcoming). And recently, the problem of replication 
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of routines has been closely studied in its own right, under the 
heading "intra-firm transfer of best practices" (Szulanski, 1994). 
Here, the focus is on the point, noted above, that the 
replication of routines typically requires support from the firm's 
existing stocks of idiosyncratic resources. This requirement 
arises because productive knowledge is not fully codified and the 
generic labor inputs available on the market do not command the 
coordinating information specific to an individual firm's routines. 
For example, the design of a new production line may draw on the 
expertise of engineers whose normal duties consist primarily of 
trouble-shooting and incremental adaptation of the prevailing 
routine. The latter role is likely t,o endow them with just the sort 
of tacit knowledge needed to create a good design for the new line, 
knowledge that is not likely to be possessed by newly hired 
engineers. 
There are implications of two related kinds. First, the 
availability of idiosyncratic resources constrains the rate at which 
routines can be replicated, and also imposes opportunity costs of 
replication. These considerations bear on the technically feasible 
and economically appropriate rate of growth of the firm as a whole. 
Penrose (1959) emphasized this causal nexus but focused almost 
entirely on managerial resources. Rubin (1973) provided a formal 
statement of the problem in the framework of the economic theory of 
production, and related theoretical issues were addressed at a more 
abstract level in the adjustment cost theory of investment (Lucas, 
1967; Gould, 1968; Treadway, 1970) 
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Second, the value of idiosyncratic resources to the firm - -  
i.e., the present value of their future rent streams - -  is affected 
by the fact that their possible uses include development of more 
idiosyncratic resources. In simple cases this involves production 
of more resources of same type, but analogous issues arise when 
resources are creatively applied to extend the capabilities of the 
firm (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 
forthcoming). In many cases this source of value may greatly 
outweigh the present value of directly productive service flows; 
such situations illustrate most strongly the role of idiosyncratic 
resources as explanations of long-term advantage. In a hypothetical 
world of fully codifiable knowledge and costless replication, this 
additional value would be associated with the knowledge per se (the 
ability to supply a flow of Arrow-type information) , and the 
competitive advantage obtained would depend on the effectiveness 
with which the firm could protect this intellectual property. In 
the world of uncertain imitability and costly replication, the 
ability to conduct the activity on a large scale in the future 
depends on the scale at which it is currently conducted, and the 
rents to superior knowledge are assignable to the underlying scarce 
resources. The extent to which these idisosyncratic resources may 
be tradeable, and the characteristics of the markets for them (if 
any) , becomes an important factor in the equation governing the 
sustainability of competitive advantage (Dierickx and Cool 1989, 
Peteraf 1993) . 
To avoid the need to allocate its existing idiosyncratic 
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resources to support replication, the firm might attempt instead to 
repeat the original learning process underlying the routine. 
Because of the context and path-dependent character of learning, 
what this would create would not be a copy of the template but a new 
routine that might, with luck, serve the same purposes (Levinthal, 
1994) . In almost all cases, such an approach would involve 
substantially higher costs: the basic distinction between the first 
and subsequent copies in Arrow-type information economics argues for 
replication; in a similar sense, so do the sunk investments in 
learning that the firm made in moving from its initial trials to a 
functioning routine. Further, reinvention would involve the 
acceptance of greater uncertainty regarding the time at which the 
new capacity would be available, as well as uncertainty regarding 
operating costs, output quality, and similarity to the existing 
routine. 
These latter uncertainties imply that, quite apart from the 
costs of reinvention de novo, the economic considerations that would 
typically motivate replication may simply not apply to reinvention. 
The profitability and quality performance of the existing routine 
are not likely to be predictive of the reinvented one; and the 
latter is likely to require accommodating changes in complementary 
routines that would not be needed under replication. In short, 
while reinvention may be a plausible alternative to abandoninq the 
activity accomplished by an existing routine, it is not generally a 
plausible alternative to replication when the goal is to seize a 
larger share of an extant profit opportunity successfully exploited 
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by the prevailing routine. 
To explore the role of replication in the history of an 
individual firm, consider a hypothetical business that has attained, 
for the moment, a competitive advantage over its rivals. This 
advantage derives from an innovative product or process that the 
firm has successfully embodied in a stable routine; the routine is 
in operation at an initial scale at some particular geographical 
site.' The operation is earning above normal returns in the 
following specific sense: if the operation could be continued 
indefinitely into the future, and current price relationships 
continue to prevail, the net present value of the resulting future 
cash flow stream would be positive (and substantial relative to the 
assets committed) when discounted at the firm's cost of capital. 
Implicit in this calculation is the assumption that the firm is 
capable of temporal replication of the routine at the initial site: 
it can replace equipment when appropriate, it can also hire new 
employees (up to an including the CEO) to replace those who quit or 
retire, and impart to them the skills required for them to play 
their roles in the continuing routine. (Note that any one-time 
costs of the original creation of the routine are sunk and do not 
affect this calculation; profitability in this forward-looking sense 
is therefore compatible with an overall loss when those one-time 
costs are included.) 
The question is, what might happen next? From the initial 
position just described, a number of different scenarios might 
follow. In each scenario, a range of interrelated analytical issues 
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are illustrated; different scenarios give different prominence to 
the various issues. Among these are (i) descriptive issues: which 
scenarios are most likely, or best typify how the economy generally 
works? (ii) prescriptive/normative issues at the firm level: what 
guidance can be offered to the firm if it is seeking the largest 
possible returns attainable from this initial position? (iii) 
normative issues at the societal level: what contribution to society 
is the firm making, and how might that differ according to the 
particular actions of the firm, or the policy context in which it 
operates? 
So far as the descriptive issues are concerned, the 
evolutionary economics view in its simplest terms emphasizes the 
following scenario: profitability is likely to be reflected in 
growth; growth is likely to involve a substantial component of 
replication or partial replication of the routine underlying the 
initial success, and that growth will ultimately end, quite possibly 
because excess returns are competed away by imitating rivals. 
Although there are many other possible scenarios, that one is focal. 
The prominence given to this scenario reflects an implicit 
judgment that information-embodying idiosyncratic resources are 
typically a key factor in success. If the initial success were a 
matter of arranging untutored generic inputs according to a fully 
codified success formula, one would expect imitation to appear 
promptly, unless the formula can be protected by intellectual 
property law or secrecy. On the other hand, if the underlying 
resources that account for initial success have no component of 
18 
(Arrow-type) information to them, then replication is not a way to 
leverage the initial success because the initial position confers no 
informational advantage over rivals. (Perhaps, in fact, there is no 
way to leverage that success). The normative advice that 
evolutionary economics derives from this descriptive account is 
this: when successful, copy yourself before others copy you. 
Further, evolutionary economics suggests that a firm with a 
profitable routine in hand has an inherent advantage in pursuing 
this strategy, by virtue of its superior access to the successful 
"template" example (Nelson and Winter, 1982, pp. 118-124) . This 
advantage is particularly significant when the existing routine 
involves tacit skills or otherwise resists codification. To the 
extent, however, that the tacitness derives from the limited "causal 
depthM of knowledge or "causal ambiguity1' of the original success, 
contextual differences between the template and the new site may 
impede replication (Nelson and Winter 1982, Lippman and Rumelt 1982, 
Winter 1982) . 
The resource-based view offers normative suggestions that are 
more comprehensive than the evolutionary view, but also less 
focused. It would suggest that the profitability of the firm in the 
initial position is attributable to its ownership of some resource, 
but the resource need not be a replicable routine. At one extreme, 
the resource might be something like the Disney characters; the most 
profitable form of "replicationN requires a substantial dose of 
added creativity. At the opposite (mundane) extreme, the resource 
might be a unique physical asset - -  a high grade ore deposit, for 
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example. Whatever opportunities may exist for leveraging this 
resource cannot take the form of replication, since it is non- 
replicable by definition. 
The resource-based view also stresses the point that imitation 
by rivals poses a threat to long-term profitability, and urges 
reliance on resources that are not susceptible to such imitation. 
Partly because such defenses are rarely perfect, the initial 
competitive advantage may not be sustainable indefinitely - -  but 
that is no reason to refrain from exploiting it vigorously in the 
medium term. In this sense, the emphasis the strategy literature 
gives to sustainable advantage may have the unintended consequence 
of diverting attention from the effective pursuit of transient 
rents.6 Finally, there is the possibility that the profitability 
of the initial position is derived from market power. This would 
have implications for the answer to the "what next?" question; in 
particular, it might eliminate replication as an approach to 
leveraging profitability. And it obviously bears also on the 
normative assessment of the situation at the societal level. 
Analytics of scarcity rent and market power. These various 
strands can be pulled together with the aid of a simple analytical 
framework illustrated in Figure 1. The diagram portrays the cost 
and demand conditions facing the profitable firm posited at the 
start of this section. Assume that the firm produces output by 
combining N different inputs in fixed proportions. If all inputs 
were increased by the same percentage, output would increase by that 
percentage: constant returns to scale prevail so far as production 
Figure 1. Scarcity Rent vs. Output ~estraint 
technique is concerned. All but one of the inputs is available in 
the market at given prices, in whatever amounts the firm might 
desire. Taken together, these N-1 inputs account for costs of C per 
unit output. The analytical focus is on the Nth input, which is 
available to the firm in a strictly limited amount. For 
convenience, call this Nth input the "constraint input." 
The diagram is subject to different interpretations according 
to the nature of the 'constraint input. Suppose initially that the 
constraint input represents the classical type of rent-earning 
resource - -  specifically, land with attributes uniquely appropriate 
to the production of the output whose demand curve D is shown in the 
diagram. Suppose also that the diagram portrays a "long runu 
analysis: the N-1 inputs may include facilities that are fixed in 
the short run, as well as short-run variable inputs, but in the long 
run all these inputs are variable. The firm in question owns the 
entire world supply of this unique resource, and is on that account 
a monopolist in the output market. Its profit-maximizing course of 
action is to fully utilize the constraint input, which suffices for 
QA units of output. Up to that level, the additional revenue 
obtained from production and sale of another unit, given by the MR 
curve, exceeds the marginal cost C, and beyond that level it is 
impossible to go. By producing at that level, the firm obtains 
revenue of (PA - C) QA in excess of the amount required to pay for 
the first N-1 inputs. If the firm is equity financed, it can use 
those funds to pay dividends. An efficient capital market will 
price the firm's stock so that those dividends represent normal 
returns. 
What is the economic nature of this surplus? The firm clearly 
has market power: it is a monopolist in the output market, based on 
its itsustainable advantagen in the form of exclusive control of an 
essential input, and it could restrict output and raise price. What 
it does not have, however, is an incentive to restrict output. Its 
profit-maximizing output is the same as a competitive industry would 
choose. If the control of the constraint input were divided among 
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numerous atomistic competitors, their competition would bid the 
price to PA - C. At that price, the circumstances of the 
availability of the constraint input would look the same to an 
individual competitor as those of any other input; any amount it 
might (practically) want would be available at the market price. 
Monopolistic market structure and "sustainable advantageu 
notwithstanding, the foregoing considerations point clearly to the 
following conclusions: (i) the difference PA - C is properly 
interpreted as a scarcity rent, (ii) the maximized economic profit 
is zero since the scarcity rent is simply the normal flow return on 
the properly calculated value of the asset. (iii) there is no 
efficiency loss from monopoly in this case.7 
Consider now a situation differing from that just described in 
a single respect: the amount of the constraint input is large 
enough to support output Q,. In this case, the monopolist does have 
an incentive to restrict output, specifically, to Q,. This 
restraint increases the excess of revenue over cost by the amount 
equal to the excess of (P, - C) Q, over (P, - C) Q,. The profit 
from output restraint is attended by an "efficiency" (total surplus) 
loss corresponding to the shaded area; output units potentially 
producible at C and valued by buyers in the range P, to P, are 
foregone. Thus "market power" is a real factor in the situation: it 
both augments net revenues relative to a competition-mimicking 
result and imposes an efficiency loss. As a matter of terminology, 
however, it seems appropriate to identify only the net revenue 
increment from output restraint as a monopoly profit, since the 
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scarcity rent (P, - C) Q, would also accrue under competitive 
organization of the industry. 
For a second interpretation of Figure 1, suppose now that the 
constraint input is a firm-specific idiosyncratic resource, such as 
the team-embodied skills that underlie the firm' s capability to 
produce its product. The different quantities of the constraint 
input now correspond to different short run situations with respect 
to the availability of these skills. There may perhaps be other 
inputs that also involve durable commitments, but it is the skills 
package that imposes the significant constraint on the rate at which 
output can be adjusted. Assume the firm can replicate the skills; 
it is simplest to assume here that although this replication is 
costly and time-consuming it does not impose an opportunity cost in 
foregone output. At a point in time when the available skills 
supply supports output level Q,, the skills earn a quasi-rent for 
the firm. And here again, although symptoms of market power are 
clearly present, the return is not affected by output restraint and 
in that sense is not a consequence of the market power in the output 
market. 
Over time, the firm could replicate the skills and, if it 
wished, produce output level Q,. But if the situation remains as 
displayed in the diagram, it obviously will not want to move beyond 
QB. In fact, it will stop somewhere short of that output level 
because of the positive costs of replicating the constraint input. 
Thus, in this "dynamizedu interpretation of the diagram, the firm 
starts in an initial region where output restraint is no issue, 
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replication is focal and the returns are plainly scarcity rents, and 
moves over time to a region where further replication is not 
desired, accurate assessment of demand conditions is focal, and 
returns are a mix of scarcity rents and monopoly returns. 
The foregoing account neglects the first phase of this stylized 
historical episode, the period when the initial level of the 
constraint input was acquired through development of a new routine, 
purchase of a piece of land, or whatever. To assess the overall 
profitability including that first phase, one would need to know not 
only the information implicit in the diagram, but also the original 
investment costs that gave rise to this idiosyncratic resource, the 
replication costs, the time rates at which everything happens, and 
the relevant cost of capital. 
Another variant of the story arises if the process is so 
esoteric or context-dependent that profitable replication is costly 
or impossible. For example, the effectiveness of the process might 
depend on features of its original location that are unique, or 
inadequately understood, and the market might be geographically 
segmented. In such a case, one might expect the operation to become 
sized relative to its original local market in a way that exploited 
some market power there, and perhaps transferred to a few other 
favorable locations. This is a more complex form of leveraging the 
key resource underlying the profitable initial position. Here, the 
absence of larger scale replication is not a reflection of monopoly 
restraint but of natural barriers to replication. 
Missing from the above stylized account is the strategically 
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important question of how long the situation depicted is likely to 
last. Various things can happen on the way from Q, to Q,, and a 
sensible firm will want to consider these scenarios as it chooses a 
path. Other firms may succeed in imitating the process or coming up 
with a substitute product; the demand curve shifts down and 
flattens, costs become focal and the mirage of a future regime of 
output restraint fades away. Alternatively, knowledge of the firm' s 
product diffuses and the demand curve shifts to the right, with the 
result that the regime in which replication is the key activity is 
extended (although an output restraint regime may remain visible in 
the distant future) . Or, the firm itself may extend the duration of 
the replication regime if it succeeds in lowering C. 
Classification of returns. The foregoing analytical exercise 
indicates that the economic and strategic issues surrounding 
idiosyncratic resources involve an interweaving of themes emphasized 
in evolutionary economics, the resource-based view, and standard 
economic analysis. The resulting picture is complex, especially 
considering the highly stylized nature of the initial framework. 
The various mechanisms alluded to in the analysis are quite general, 
but others were passed over because they do not fit easily into the 
stylized picture presented by Figure 1. This section presents a 
more comprehensive and qualitative summary of the issues, 
schematically organized in Figure 2. 
A slightly amended version of the premise of the preceding 
analysis serves to organize this summary. Whereas the discussion of 
Figure 1 proceeded by contrasting a "team-embodied skillsu 
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interpretation with other interpretations of the constraint input, 
this section acknowledges that multiple obstacles to leveraging a 
profitable position may be present simultaneously. 
The first question to be asked is whether the innovator 
possesses a replicable routine. The answer may be no - -  a situation 
corresponding to the left branch of Figure 2. The reasons may be 
(i) characteristic of the site (an ore deposit of distinctive 
quality and other attributes, or a resort locale in a unique natural 
setting) . Alternatively, (ii) , the obstacles to replication may lie 
in the cognitive and motivational characteristics of the routine 
considered as a problem solution - -  complexity, tacitness, lucky 
outcomes in highly path-dependent organizational learning, a strong 
high-performance culture, and so on. Or, (iii) , interactions of the 
routine with its site may be involved: the features of the routine 
that resist replication may be the determinants of its effectiveness 
in coping with the particular flow of micro-problems characteristic 
of the site - -  short-term variations characteristic of the site's 
particular raw material sources, environmental contaminants, labor 
pool, or customer'population. 
Whatever the reason for the lack of replicability, the 
consequence is that the innovative routine is of determinate scale. 
Demand conditions then determine whether this scale is small or 
large relative to the market, and, closely related, whether demand 
elasticity is large or small. If product attributes are not unique, 
and if transportation costs are not a major factor, the likely case 
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is that the scale is small and the demand highly elastic. At the 
extreme, this is one output source out of many in a world market. 
The economic outcome is of the type illustrated by Q, in Figure 1: 
there is a flow of return that is of the nature of a Ricardian rent 
to the scarce resource represented by the routine. The presence of 
this source of supply may affect the price, as it does in Figure 1, 
but not to the point where output restraint becomes an issue. 
If product attributes are sufficiently unique or other 
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considerations limit the extent and elasticity of demand, it is 
conceivable that the initial scale might exceed the long run profit- 
maximizing level. This is illustrated by the position of Q, in 
Figure 1. Considerations of output restraint come into play in the 
sense that incentives for down-sizing exist. A response to those 
incentives might well present hazards for the stability of the 
routine, since, for example, different task allocations would be 
required in a smaller workforce. Also, an adequate analysis of the 
economics of such a situation would involve attention to the 
distinctions among variable, fixed and sunk costs, and also to the 
possibilities of price discrimination. (Consider a new resort hotel 
in a unique location, built and staffed at so large a scale that it 
cannot be kept full at a profit - -  a potential "white elephant.") 
Thus, it is not entirely obvious that the ultimate outcome closely 
approximates the one illustrated by Q, in Figure 1. If the returns 
realizable (on a forward-looking basis) are sufficient to make the 
operation viable with some room to spare, they are interpretable as 
a mix of scarcity rents and monopoly returns. 
These two outcomes correspond to the left hand branch of Figure 
2, with output restraint involved only in the second. The 
structure of the diagram reflects a basic proposition of 
evolutionary economics that was mentioned previously: replication of 
an established routine is much easier than imitation, because the 
imitator does not have the advantage of full access to the template 
(assuming the imitatee is not cooperating with the effort). Thus, 
it is assumed that a "noM answer on the feasibility of replication 
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implies the same answer for the feasibility of imitation. By 
contrast, on the right hand of Figure 2, the "yes" answer on 
replication poses the imitation question as the follow-on. 
Figure 2 presumes that, if replication is possible, it continues 
until the economic incentives for it have been eliminated. The 
elimination of these incentives can occur by two basic mechanisms, 
leading to two end conditions that are distinguished by the 
different returns received by the innovating firm. At one extreme, 
on the right hand side of the diagram, imitation sooner or later 
produces something approximating textbook competition, and hence 
zero economic profit from a forward-looking point of view. Looking 
forward, the once-innovative routine and the techniques for 
replicating it become known sufficiently widely so that this 
knowledge, per se, no longer commands a significant scarcity rent. 
Resources that are routine-specific continue to be involved, perhaps 
to an even greater degree than in the early days of the innovation. 
But since the nature of these resources and the methods for creating 
them are sufficiently widely understood, the logic of investment in 
these routine-specific capabilities is entirely conventional. 
It should be emphasized again that this analysis say nothing at 
all about how the innovator fared in the episode as a whole. 
Looking backward, the balance between initial investments and the 
pace of imitation are key determinants of the temporary excess 
returns received by the innovator (the level of Schumpeterian 
rents) . Given the size of the initial advantage the innovation 
confers, low investment in creating it and slow imitation spell 
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greater financial success for the innovator. 
The other possibility is that imitation does not occur, at 
least not in such a way as to leave the innovator with a future 
prospect of only normal returns. In this case, the innovating firm 
has significant control over the scale at which the innovation is 
implemented in the long run. Failure to take account of the limits 
of the market when exercising this control would be tantamount to 
the firm's competing with itself to bring its own economic profit 
level to zero. Thus, the innovator will want to approach a result 
represented by Q, in Figure 1. This stylized representation hardly 
suggests the complexity of the problem, however. In typical cases 
where geography and transportation costs matter, and there are 
significant differences in the local economic environments at the 
different sites where the routine might be established, the 
replication of the routine will typically involve its adaptation as 
well. The problem of appropriate scale may be faced many times over 
in isolated markets, or, more complex still, in a series of markets 
that are distinguishable but interconnected. The aggregate scale 
achieved through replication may itself induce change because of the 
managerial challenges it presents and the new scale-related 
innovative opportunities it reveals. 
In the end, as concluded in Figure 2, the assumed absence of 
multiple competitors willing and able to do the same thing implies 
an element of output restraint and monopoly returns at the long-run 
position to which the firm is headed. An analysis of the full 
episode in present value terms might well reveal, however, that 
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these persistent monopoly returns are a minor factor compared to the 
scarcity rents received in earlier phases of the replication path 
(Q, - type conditions) . 
ASSESSING PROFITABILITY: CONCEPTS AND MEASURES 
Although the field of strategic management has been informed 
increasingly from economics over the past two decades, surprisingly 
little attention has been paid to the basic question of what 
l'profitable" really means. Economists worked hard for a couple of 
centuries to arrive at analytically useful meanings of terms like 
"costIu "rent," and "profit." Although this protracted effort 
produced something short of a full consensus regarding appropriate 
theoretical terminology, it certainly generated a sophisticated 
understanding of many of the issues involved. That understanding 
has infiltrated the strategic management literature only recently, 
however. 
In general terms, at least, there seems to be a strong 
consensus that profitability is central to what the strategic 
management field is about. Many would endorse the statement that 
"The fundamental question in the field of strategic management is 
how do firms achieve and sustain competitive advantage." (Teece, 
Pisano and Shuen, 1994, p. 1). "Competitive advantage" is typically 
defined as superior financial performance. Beyond this point, 
however, conceptual clarity starts to fade. The idea of superior 
financial performance may be evoked by a range of phrases such as 
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"above normal returns," "high quasi-rents," "value creationN and 
other near-synonyms for "making money." For empirical work, a more 
operational definition of "making money" is needed. Numerous 
alternatives are available and have been selected in one study or 
another (sometimes with little discussion of their appropriateness) : 
for example, returns on assets, return on equity, total return to 
investors, Tobin' s q, and others. 
To develop a stronger theoretical grounding for the discussion 
of profitability, it is important to note first that economists have 
developed a relatively clear idea of what an economic cost is: it is 
an opportunity cost in one sense or another. There is less 
terminological clarity regarding returns in excess of costs, such as 
profits or rents, partly because different perspectives on the 
opportunities referenced in opportunity cost lead to different 
perspectives on whether a return is "excess". For example, the 
return measured by (PA - C) QA in Figure 1 is a "rent from the point 
of view of the industryu when the industry is competitively 
organized, but certainly is not an excess return at the individual 
firm level; the firm has to pay the market price, reflecting the 
foregone opportunity to use the resource in another firm. 
The importation of profitability concepts from economics into 
strategic management faces three substantial difficulties. The 
first problem is that an abnormally high return in economic theory 
is generally measured against a social opportunity cost standard - -  
a standard that has little relation to the business world's meaning 
of profitability. For example, a monopoly acquired at a price 
reflecting the present value of its future returns is still a 
profitable monopoly by the economist's standards. The fact that it 
yields only a normal return to its investors has nothing to do with 
the economic case, but everything to do with the strategic 
management case (cf . Barney, 1986) . The second problem is that 
those economic concepts reside most comfortably in the abstract 
world of those regions of economic theory characterized by complete 
and perfect markets, optimization and equilibrium. They are 
somewhat alien to the world of flux, uncertainty and strategic moves 
that the strategic management literature seeks to address. Finally, 
the available quantitative measures of financial performance, based 
either in accounting data or securities markets valuations, 
generally lack a coherent rationale in terms of the analytical needs 
of either economics or strategic management. l1 (Of course, some 
measures are better than others: "earnings per share" is little more 
than a trap for the unwary; measures like total return to investors 
and Tobin's q have problems, but of far smaller magnitude.) 
Among the specific conceptual issues evoked but not thoroughly 
discussed in the previous section, the first that deserves scrutiny 
is whether ownership of a resource that earns a Ricardian scarcity 
rent should be considered, by itself, to confer competitive 
advantage. (This situation corresponds to the first interpretation 
offered for Figure 1, and to the far left-hand branch of Figure 2.) 
Many authors suggest an affirmative answer. For example, Porter's 
(1980) discussion of barriers to entry includes the following: 
"a Favorable access to raw materials: 
established firms may have locked up the 
most favorable sources and/or tied up 
foreseeable needs early at prices reflectinq 
a lower demand for them than currentlv 
exists. 
" 0  Favorable locations: established firms may 
have cornered favorable locations before 
market forces bid up prices to capture their 
full value." 
- -  Porter (1980, p. 11) 
(emphasis supplied) 
Similarly, Ghemawat says: 
I1Access (to resources or customers) will lead to a 
sustainable advantage if two conditions are met: it_ 
must be secured under better terms than competitors 
will be able to set later, and the advantase 
has to be enforceable over the lons run. 
Enforceabilitv can come from ownership . . . . "  
- -  Ghemawat (1986, p. 5 5 )  
(emphasis supplied) 
These statements suggest that sustainable advantage can be 
generated by the combination of some past speculative coup with 
historical cost accounting. Buying low and selling high is 
certainly a way to make money, and buying resources low and selling 
the derived products high is a variant of that basic formula. 
However, if the speculative success occurred a long time ago, and if 
the rent-earning asset could be sold at a current market value, it 
is not clear why possession of such a rent-earning asset is any more 
a source of advantage than possession of the corresponding amount of 
well-invested cash. Under these circumstances, a management that 
prides itself on its ability to generate "above normal returnsN as 
reflected in (book) ROA is a management that may be inviting a 
takeover bid. 
The second issue has with the historical path 
profitability in a particular firm as it grows by replicating its 
routines and the associated idiosyncratic resources. As it grows, 
such a firm is investing in a variety of intangible assets, 
transforming generic inputs by imparting to them the particular 
information, skills, locations and relationships that make these 
assets capable of carrying out the firmr s routines. Particularly in 
the case of the firm-specific human capital imparted to employees, 
the firm cannot own these intangible assets, though it may have 
good reason to expect that it can draw on their services in the 
future . Accounting conventions typically yield a distorted 
economic picture of such a growth phase, under-reporting economic 
earnings by failing to recognize that some portion of what is 
designated as current cost is actually investment. As the firm's 
growth slows to the point where new investments of this type are 
approximately balanced by renewal of old ones, the earnings picture 
becomes more accurate. The accounting distortions of the past live 
on, however, in a new form: rates of return on assets are overstated 
because of the understatement of the asset base. Historical cost 
accounting produces a similar but more correctable form of this 
distortion; for example, in the calculation of Tobin's q the 
valuation of assets at replacement cost provides such a correction. 
This adjustment cannot, however, compensate for the fact that some 
important types of assets are missing from the accountants' lists in 
the first place. 
If "sustainable advantageM is something that is supposed to be 
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reflected in accounting measures like ROA, then it appears that 
there is a relatively straightforward way to achieve it: invest in 
long-lasting assets that do not show up on the balance sheet, a 
prime example being the initial learning that gives rise to new, 
replicable routines. In a hypothetical world in which everyone 
else's assets are fully reflected on the balance sheet, outstanding 
performance in terms of ROA might even be achievable by a series of 
investment projects with zero net present value, provided the 
shareholders are patient enough to put up with the understated 
earnings of the early years. 
At the level of the firm as a whole, reliance on stock market- 
based valuations might appear to offer an escape from the range of 
measurement errors just discussed. According to the (semi-strong) 
efficient markets hypothesis, publicly available information about 
the future earning power of the firm's assets will be fully 
reflected in the prices of its securities. There are, however, 
three significant shortcomings to stock market-based performance 
measures: (i) they presume that the shareholders are the only 
claimants whose interests are at stake;12 (ii) they do not provide 
valuations at the level of individual resources or conveyable 
packages, but only of the firm as a whole; (iii) they necessarily 
rely on the presumption that the relevant in£ ormat ion is public, 
although keeping secrets is often an important part of effective 
strategic management. (Indeed, the resource-based view suggests, 
following a path blazed by Hirshleifer (1971), that maintaining 
secrecy about its own future plans is one way that a company might 
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obtain resources at prices below their future market values.) But 
at least the stock market provides a valuation untainted by 
accounting conventions or other artifacts of historical measurement. 
Where stock market valuations and derived performance measures 
are concerned, the famous list of five forces enumerated by Porter 
(1980) needs to be supplemented by a sixth: investor expectations. 
If the other five forces do not whittle away abnormally high 
returns, investors will happily get used to them. The market will 
certainly learn to discount systematic, sustained earning power, 
even if the sources of that power are not fully understood. Once 
this happens, any superiority disappears so far as stock market- 
based measurement is concerned. Imagine the frustration of a 
(hypothetically) perfect profit-maximizing CEO, fully capable of 
implementing every bit of valid strategic advice available from any 
source, who has the misfortune to lead a company that has been 
managed to that same high standard for decades on end. Pure good 
luck aside, it will be impossible for this superlative manager to 
look more than ordinary on stock market-based measures. The 
advantage goes to the manager who inherits a rich fund of strategic 
mistakes that can be corrected, provided that the market's awareness 
of the correctability of the mistakes does not precede her accession 
to office. 
None of the foregoing should be interpreted as implying 
skepticism about the existence of real differences in financial 
performance, or as denying that available operational measures 
capture some of those differences. It does suggest, however, that 
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both the resource-based view and evolutionary economics need to 
contribute more to the conceptualization and measurement of 
profitability than has been the case thus far. Attention to this 
agenda is particularly urgent when the questions under examination 
involve comparing the performance of the same firm at different 
points of time. It is judgments on these questions that are most 
likely to be distorted because the available data contain little 
clue as the actual timing of key speculative successes or key 
developmental investments in idisosyncratic resources. 
SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
When a business succeeds in obtaining "competitive advantage" 
over its rivals, are the consequences for society at large generally 
favorable or unfavorable? There is, course, no general answer. It 
all depends, and in particular it depends on the nature of the 
advantage, how it was obtained, and how it is maintained. Recent 
commentary has pointed out, however, that different approaches to 
strategic analysis seem to imply different general orientations to 
this question. Since there is presumably no dispute about the 
observation that real cases vary across a wide spectrum, it is 
probably useful to think of these differences as relating to "first 
approximations" or "rebuttable presumptions about the typical case." 
In particular, the competitive forces approach pioneered by 
Porter (1980) is seen as one in which the typical source of superior 
profitability is some form of market power. Forceful comments to 
this effect have been offered by Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1994) : 
"This approach, rooted in the structure-conduct - 
performance paradigm of industrial organization, . . .  
emphasizes the actions a firm can take to create 
defensible positions against market forces. 
Economic rent.s in the competitive forces framework 
are monopoly rents . . .  Firms in an industry earn 
rents when they are somehow able to impede the 
competitive forces (in either factor markets or 
product markets) which tend to drive economic returns 
to zero. 
- -  Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1994 
PP . 
By constrast, the resource-based view of the firm, the dynamic 
capabilities approach, evolutionary economics, the Chicago school 
view in industrial economics (e.g., Demsetz 1973) and the 
Schumpeterian tradition (1934, 1950) are all seen as emphasizing 
that profitability may derive .instead from superior efficiency 
(Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1994; Rumelt, Schendel and Teece 1991; 
Foss, Knudsen and Montgomery 1994). 
The analytical scheme presented earlier in this paper lends 
some detail, and hence some complication, to this broad-brush 
contrast. An innovating firm seeking to operate on a larger scale, 
but temporarily constrained by its stock of idiosyncratic resources, 
may be highly prof itable. By some tests it may have "market power, " 
but this is no way implies that it is exercising socially 
undesirable retraint over its output: such restraint is the 
furthest thing from its management's mind. The happiest version of 
the story is that the innovator collects sufficient Schumpeterian 
rents to cover its initial costs and offer some encouragement 
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to other innovators, but ultimately settles into an essentially 
competitive relationship with its rivals, while its innovation is 
applied at socially efficient levels. Of course, if imitation is 
successfully blocked, the episode may end in a period of output 
restraint. But even that persists only until the next gale of 
Schumpeterian creative destruction passes through. 
Although the happy version of the story is only one case, it 
certainly provides an uplifting contrast to the static barriers-to- 
entry story offered by the competitive forces approach. 
Unfortunately, a cloud of complexity must be added to this 
carefully-selected sunny picture. There is a another form of output 
restraint to be considered: the restraint imposed by the innovator's 
ability to restrain imitation. Even in the early stages of an 
innovator's growth, the returns earned by the innovator can only be 
said to be untainted by output restraint, siven the imitation 
barriers that restrain the outputs of other firms. These barriers 
may be partly "natural" reflecting the intrinsic difficulty of 
imitation, but there are also important institutional barriers. 
These include patent and trade secret protection, but also a more 
fundamental institutional barrier that crucially fortifies the 
natural ones: the absence of an af firmative legal obligation of the 
imitatee to cooperate with the imitator. The notion that the 
innovator might have such an affirmative obligation is of course 
quite remote from institutional reality; nevertheless, in principle 
the absence of cooperation from the imitatee is a potential source 
of inefficiency just as other imitation barriers are. l3 Finally, 
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of course, the innovator is likely to take strategic action to 
enhance the effect of the natural and institutional barriers. 
When posed in a realistic institutional setting, and with due 
recognition of the importance of innovation incentives, the problems 
of social welfare assessment raised here lead into deep analytical 
waters. As Rumelt (1984) has suggested, it is fortunate and 
liberating for analysts in the strategy field that rendering sharp 
verdicts on these difficult problems is not among our central 
concerns (p. 561) . There seems to be merit in the general idea that 
the quest for profit is appraised more favorably by evolutionary 
economics and the resource-based view than by the competitive forces 
approach. We can leave the details for someone else to work out. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has explored a piece of intellectual territory that 
is common ground for the resource-based view and evolutionary 
economics: a firm can effectively leverage a profitable initial 
resource position represented by superior routines and its 
associated team-embodied skills, and this leveraging is accomplished 
by replicating the routines. In this area, evolutionary economics 
provides a relatively detailed account of one part of the dynamic 
aspect of strategic management. It is an important part of the 
total problem, but, as was noted more than once, only a part. 
Aside from its importance, what recommends it for careful 
discussion is that it is a comparatively simple part of the total 
problem. The llspeculative'l and "creative" components of the problem 
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of dynamic resource exploitation were mentioned but left aside. The 
complications of replicating routines in novel contexts received 
even more casual treatment. Corporate-level capabilities and 
management issues were left implicit, although the corporate level 
is the arena of the great managerial challenges of scale and scope 
described by Chandler (1991). These simplifications made possible 
a clearer view of some central issues in the descriptive and 
normative analysis of the quest for profit. The issues thus 
revealed may be obscured but certainly do not go away when more 
realistic complications are added to the picture. Like the quest 
for profit itself, the quest for better understanding of 
profitability can be expected to continue for a long time to come. 
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Notes 
* With the customary caveats, I would like to express my 
appreciation for the helpful comments on an earlier draft that I 
received from Connie Helfat, Dan Levinthal and - -  especially - -  
Cynthia Montgomery. 
1. In a helpful conceptual discussion, Amit and Schoemaker (1993) 
narrow the term resources to refer to "stocks of available factors 
owned or controlled by the firmlt, most if not all of which are 
tradable. "Capabilities, in contrast, refer to a firm's capacity 
to deploy Resources . . . .  It (p. 34). Routines, not explicitly 
mentioned by Amit and Schoemaker, are among the organizational 
processes underlying capabilities. However, since routines are 
not just a way of deploying, but deployable in their own right, 
they arguably belong under the resources rubric as well. 
2. Biologist Stephen Jay Gould wrote a fascinating essay in 
recognition of the "50th birthday" of Mickey Mouse. He identifies 
interesting parallels between the transformation of Mickey's image 
by cultural evolution . e l  creative resource dynamics) and the 
evolutionary development of the human species (Gould, 1980, Chapter 
9). 
3. See the HBS case ALTOONA CORPORATION: CONSUMER PRODUCTS 
DIVISION for an interesting account of an organization stressed by 
these sorts of competing demands on its key engineers. 
4. This appraisal needs to be qualified, however, when rapidly 
advancing technology has greatly enriched the design options 
available for the creation of a new routine. 
5. An empirically important possibility is being set aside here: 
initial success may prove to be a transient phenomenon; no stable 
routine may emerge that is capable of sustaining the success over 
time. One common explanation for this outcome is that the initial 
success was crucially dependent on the roles played by particular 
individuals, and was not sustainable when some of those individuals 
left the scene or lost their enthusiasm for the cause. 
6. Barney defines a sustained advantage as one that "continues to 
exist after efforts to duplicate that advantage have ceased." 
(1991, p. 102). On this definition, very significant and long- 
lasting profit opportunities are outside of the scope of the 
"sustained advantage" analysis. 
7. Some theorists may object that the absence of an efficiency loss 
is attributable to the sharp corners in the diagram: if marginal 
cost rose continuously as output approached an upper bound, there 
would be at least some efficiency loss. While this is true, it is 
also true that there are continuous examples that lie as close as 
one likes, in quantitative terms, to the Figure 1 case. Thus, 
continuity itself is not the issue. The example of Figure 1 
captures the analytical connotation of "rent" and dramatizes the 
distinction between a scarcity rent and a monopoly return. 
8. That this difference is positive follows directly from the fact 
that the equation of marginal revenue and marginal cost identifies 
the profit maximizing position. The difference corresponds, in 
fact, to the area of triangle bde. 
9. Peteraf (1993) provides the most careful statement thus far of 
the theoretical connections between the rent concepts of economics 
and the concerns of strategic management. The present paper 
concurs with her analysis on a number of key points. 
10. Tobinis q is defined as the market value of the company's 
assets (from the liabilities side) divided by the replacement cost 
valuation of those assets (assets side). 
11. Merging aspects of the second and third points, Beaver and 
Demski (1979) argue convincingly that income measurement can be 
well defined only in the context of complete markets. Outside of 
this hypothetical context accounting rules can be rationalized only 
on pragmatic cost-benefit grounds. 
12. Aside from employees, customers, suppliers and other familiar 
entries on the extended list of stakeholders, there is top 
management. Castanias and Helfat (1991) argue, in effect, that a 
"managerialist" interpretation of the corporation may be 
economically sound, at least in the sense that managers are more 
likely to be providing idisosyncratic rent-earning resources than 
the providers of financial capital. 
13. For a good, concise statement on this issue see Koopmans (1957, 
pp. 64-66.) 
